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Abstract 
The history of the self is a flourishing field. Nevertheless, there are some problems that have 
proven difficult to overcome, mainly concerning teleology, the universality or particularity of 
the self and the gap between ideas and experiences of the self. In this article, I make two 
methodological suggestions to address these issues. First, I propose a ‘queering’ of the self, 
inspired by recent developments in the history of sexuality. By destabilizing the modern self 
and writing the histories of its different and paradoxical aspects, we can better attend to 
continuities and discontinuities in the history of the self and break up the idea of a linear and 
unitary history. I discern four overlapping and intersecting axes along which discourses of the 
self present themselves: (1) interiority and outer orientation, (2) stability and flexibility, (3) 
holism and fragmentation, and (4) self-control and dispossession. Second, I propose studying 
four ‘practices of self’ through which the self is created, namely (1) techniques of self, (2) 
self-talk, (3) interpreting the self, and (4) regulating practices. Analysing these practices 
allows one to go beyond debates about experience versus expression, and to recognize that 
expressions of self are never just expressions, but make up the self itself. 
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The history of the self is a flourishing field. It has recently been observed that ‘the flood of 
publications’ on the subject of the self, ‘cannot be surveyed anymore’ (Keller, 2008: 19; cited 
in Sabean and Stefanovska, 2012: 13n3). Several scholars have noted the importance of the 
history of the self: not only is the self a product of historical developments, it is also a cause 
of historical change. The self has a history and this history can and needs to be studied (Hunt, 
2014: 1585; Owens and Samblanet, 2013: 230). This is, however, a most hazardous 
enterprise, as the many publications on the self bring along very different definitions, 
methods and research traditions. There is absolutely no agreement on what the historiography 
of the self exactly examines, there is even no consensus about what the self is. As Lynn Hunt 
(2014: 1579) has recently stated, ‘given the uncertainties about selfhood (what it is and how it 
is produced), it might seem that any history of the self is next to impossible’.1 How then, can 
we do the history of the self? 
In this article, I propose a programme for the study of the history of the self. Due to 
the lack of conceptual clarity, many scholars are talking past each other. There is little real 
interaction of ideas and there is often confusion about what, exactly, is being said. I will 
therefore make some suggestions for defining the self as a research object, and for ways of 
studying its history. Although the history of the self is a very popular domain, I will show 
that there are some remaining theoretical and conceptual problems, mainly concerning 
teleology, the universality or particularity of the self and the gap between ideas and 
experiences of the self.  
To address the problem of teleology and the universality or particularity of the self, I 
will borrow from the history of sexuality and ‘queer’ the history of the self. Modern 
conceptions of self are not uniform. We should destabilize the modern self and write the 
histories of its different and paradoxical aspects. To this end, I discern four axes along which 
the history of the self can be written: (1) interiority and outer orientation, (2) stability and 
flexibility, (3) holism and fragmentation, and (4) self-control and dispossession. These four 
axes overlap, intersect and interact; they are not separate histories. Distinguishing them 
makes it possible to break up the idea of a linear and unitary history of the self and to better 
understand continuities and changes in the past. 
                                                     
1 Hunt herself has proposed a solution to this problem, referring to neuroscience as a source of inspiration to conduct the 
history of the self. Although my approach here is different, our arguments touch on several common points, particularly 
concerning the embodiment of the self and the usefulness of the history of emotions to the history of the self. 
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The second innovation that I propose is inspired by recent debates in emotions 
history. To be able to bridge the perceived gap between ideas and experiences of self, I 
suggest using the concept of ‘practices of self’. Practices of the self are the things people do 
to shape, form and transform the self. A particular sense of self does not exist prior to these 
practices, but is created in them. Particular practices of self are: (1) techniques of the self, 
employed with the goal of transforming one’s own self; (2) self-talk, speaking about the self; 
(3) interpreting the self, looking for causes for and explanations of an individual’s actions, 
and (4) regulating practices that convey social norms concerning the self. 
I do not wish to overstate my originality: this article builds on earlier theoretical 
reflections by other scholars, both in the history of the self and in its neighbouring domains of 
study. My main intent is to bring together scattered arguments and methods. The focus of the 
examples in this article will be on the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, which are my area 
of expertise and one of the most popular time periods for studies in the history of the self. My 
intention here is more methodological rather than epistemological and purely theoretical. 
Although the methods that I propose imply certain theoretical and ontological positions, I will 
not extensively argue these positions. I will, however, refer to the relevant publications that 
do provide such argumentations. 
 
What is this self, actually? 
One fundamental problem needs to be addressed first: what is the self? Scholars have not 
agreed upon a single definition, and to make things even more complicated, use the concept 
in quite different ways. The word ‘self’ has been used to signify: (1) the individual or person 
(e.g. Coleman, 2014); (2) the cultural conception of the individual (e.g. Geertz, 1974; Mauss, 
1938; Taylor, 1989); (3) the cultural conception of a part of the individual (e.g. Goldstein, 
2005); (4) the cultural conception of a psychic entity in the individual (e.g. Lyons, 1978; 
Wahrman, 2004); (5) personality; (6) self-consciousness; (7) self-presentation; and (8) 
identity (adapted from Spiro, 1993: 114). As a consequence, for instance, recent studies of the 
‘scholarly self’, which are about social norms and self-presentation of scholars (Paul, 2012), 
have little in common with Dror Wahrman’s (2004: xi) ‘modern self’, the ‘essential core’ that 
founds human identities. The conceptual confusion has allowed one prominent historian to 
claim even very recently that cultural historians have investigated the self ‘only secondarily, 
if at all’ (Hunt, 2014: 1578). 
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It may not be possible or indeed not even desirable to definitively define the self. Still, 
I believe that we need to somehow specify what we are talking about when we talk about the 
self, so that we avoid talking past each other. Any sort of ‘working definition’ of the self 
risks, however, creating the illusion of the self as something stable, something with a singular 
history. In establishing this working definition, I certainly do not attempt to capture the 
‘essence’ of the self, but merely to point to where a study of the self could start – without 
stipulating where it should end. 
Jan Goldstein (2005: 2) has considered the self as ‘individuated mental stuff’. This 
seems like a good starting point, because it covers the terrain most historians (though perhaps 
not most philosophers and anthropologists) study when they study the self. According to this 
view, the self is, firstly, ‘mental’ or ‘psychic’ in the broadest sense of these words. When we 
study the self, we study the way people think and feel. This does not need to preclude 
conceptions of the self that do not recognize a division between mind and body: the point of 
defining the history of the self as concerned with mental stuff is to differentiate it from, for 
instance, approaches to the history of the body that do not take into account the ways people 
think and feel. 
Secondly, the self is ‘individuated’, distinguished from other people. The self marks 
the boundaries between people. This distinguishes the history of the self from certain 
approaches to the history of collective identities that do not take the individual experience 
into account. Again, this does not need to preclude conceptions of the self that are socially 
oriented or that do not or only minimally recognize a difference between an individual and 
his or her social groups.  
This working definition of the self as ‘individuated mental stuff’ is vested in two 
oppositions (self vs body, self vs other) that are not universally recognized. This is why I 
reiterate that it is only a starting point for the history of the self, based on what is perhaps 
today commonly taken as characteristic of the self in Western Europe and Northern America. 
This starting point may lead to very different conceptions at other times and in other places. 
Mind and body may be conceptualized differently and viewed as more or less divided, and 
the individual may likewise be considered as more or less autonomous from others. This 
allows one to study very different conceptions of self, such as a romantic conception of the 
self as an ‘inner core’, a religious understanding of self as ‘soul’, an idealistic understanding 
as ‘spirit’, a psychoanalytical understanding as ‘ego’, or a psychological understanding as 




Queering the history of the self 
Even among those scholars who share a somewhat similar conception of what they are 
researching, there is a debate whether the self is a ‘peculiar idea within the context of the 
world’s cultures’, or rather ‘a universal, like culture’ (Geertz, 1974: 31; Sökefeld, 1999: 429). 
The debate was especially fierce among anthropologists in the 1990s, reacting against 
Clifford Geertz’s work. Following Marcel Mauss, Geertz (1974: 31) claimed that the person, 
which he equates with the self, is conceived in the Western world as ‘a bounded, unique, 
more or less integrated motivational and cognitive universe, a dynamic center of awareness, 
emotion, judgement and action organized into a distinctive whole and set contrastively 
against other such wholes and against its social and natural background’. This was, he 
argued, different in most other cultures. 
Several anthropologists took issue with this view. Two critiques are interesting for my 
purposes here: Melford Spiro (1993) has argued that all cultures make some distinction 
between ‘self’ and ‘other’, as is demonstrated by the presence of a pronoun signifying ‘I’ in 
every known language. Even in cultures where the existence of an inner self was explicitly 
denied, in practice, he argued, people did use such a self-concept: the autonomous, egocentric 
and independent self was quite common outside the West. Another strand of critique focused 
on the unitary view on the Western self: several anthropologists have argued that there are 
many different conceptions of self in the West as well, and that Geertz’s view on the Western 
self was mostly derived from written philosophical traditions, not from analyses of 
experiences (Holland and Kipnis, 1994; Murray, 1993; Sökefeld, 1999). 
These arguments are reminiscent of a debate which has preoccupied historians of 
homosexuality for a long time. Inspired by Mary McIntosh’s (1968) article on ‘the 
homosexual role’, many historians and sociologists started to argue that the Western 
conception of homosexuality was not universal, but historically constructed. They have been 
labelled ‘constructionists’ and opposed to ‘essentialists’, who argued that a ‘homosexual 
essence’ of some kind has always existed (Stein, 1992). ‘Essentialists’ heaped up anecdotal 
‘evidence’ of homosexuality in past times (Boswell, 1980; Norton, 1997), while 
‘constructionists’ argued that it was only in the late nineteenth century (or, for some, the 
eighteenth century, or earlier, or later) that the homosexual, as a distinct being desiring sex 
and love with people of his or her own sex, came into existence (Greenberg, 1988; Halperin, 
1990; Trumbach, 1989). 
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The debates soon degenerated into a deaf man’s talk and new scholars sought a way 
out of them. With her Epistemology of the Closet (1990) Eve Kosofsky Sedgwick laid the 
foundation of what became known as ‘queer theory’. She argued against a Foucauldian 
epistemological rupture, a ‘Great Paradigm Shift’ with the ‘birth of the homosexual’, for it 
obscured the incoherence and instability of ‘homosexuality as we conceive of it today’. The 
concept of ‘homosexuality’, she wrote, is defined and used in overlapping, contradictory and 
conflicting ways. Earlier ways of conceiving sexuality continue to interfere with new ideas. 
Some queer theorists – mostly scholars active in literary and cultural studies – following in 
her wake have then decided that is was time to leave the study of historical developments for 
what they were altogether, as it was considered to be necessarily ‘teleological’ and 
‘heteronormative’ (cf. Traub, 2013). 
Most historians, of course, would not go so far. Queer theory’s criticisms, however, 
inspired them to reflect on the matters of continuity and change, coherence and incoherence 
and stability and instability. David Halperin (2000, 2002) has most fruitfully adapted his 
earlier ideas on the construction of homosexuality to accommodate Sedgwick’s criticisms. In 
How to do the History of Homosexuality, he claimed that every history of homosexuality 
should start from modern notions of homosexuality, in all their incoherence. Historians 
should then disintegrate this concept, trace the genetic origins of its different aspects and 
locate their convergences. Modern homosexuality should be distinguished from these earlier 
discourses, but continuities should also be acknowledged. Such a project, he claimed, ‘would 
be able to capture the play of identities and differences within the synchronic multiplicity of 
different but simultaneous traditions of discourse that have existed through the ages as well as 
the play of identities and differences across the various diachronic transitions within each of 
them over the course of time’ (Halperin, 2002: 108). He then distinguished four categories of 
understandings of male sex and gender deviance, and sketched their history and their relation 
to the modern category of homosexuality. 
In light of these debates and parallel tendencies towards destabilization in other fields, 
it seems useful to adopt a similar approach to the history of the self. By ‘queering’ the history 
of the self, by starting from modern notions of self, destabilizing them and tracing the 
histories of their different and contradicting aspects, we can move beyond the impasse 
between universalists and peculiarists. Some aspects of the modern self recur across different 
cultures and periods, while others are rather less common. It is most important to recognize, 
in these histories, differences along lines of gender, class and race, while at same time 
questioning the viability of these very categories, destabilising and deconstructing them by 
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analysing inherent mechanisms of power distribution. Queering the history of the self makes 
it possible to deal with accusations of teleology by readily acknowledging a start from present 
conceptions of self, but investigating their valence throughout history. ‘Queering’ is, 
moreover, associated with ‘reading against the grain’, destabilizing and disrupting established 
notions of historical developments and rendering things undecipherable (Houlbrook, 2013). 
Incomprehensibility should not be the end, but it may be a means to advance research into 
new directions. 
For the remainder of this section, I discern four axes along which the self is and has 
been conceived. They are linked and overlap in important ways, but all have their own 
specificities. The ‘modern self’, interior, stable, whole and in control of itself, is one specific 
constellation of these axes. Although the discourses on the axes I discern seem mutually 
exclusive, this is not necessarily the case, as the self and its conceptions are always unstable 
and full of paradoxes. The axes that I discern here are of course by no means a definitive or 
exhaustive enumeration of all the variables that make up ‘our current conception of self’. I 
merely intend to tentatively distinguish some crucial aspects of what makes up this current 
conception of self, in order to be able to write their histories, and in order to see similarities 
and differences, discrepancies and paradoxes within and between these different variables. 
As I indicated in the introduction, the four axes that I discern are (1) interiority and 
outer orientation, (2) stability and flexibility, (3) holism and fragmentation, and (4) self-
control and dispossession. While the first of each of these variables has traditionally been 
considered to be constituent of the ‘modern’ conception of self, the others continue to disturb 
this self. 
Interiority, a sense of inner depths, is perhaps one of the most crucial elements in the 
historiography of the modern self. Charles Taylor (1989) has discussed the history of the self 
as a process of a growing sense of inwardness. Dror Wahrman (2004: 179–89) has similarly 
insisted that a sense of inner depths was an essential aspect of the ‘modern self’ that 
developed around 1780. Prior to this time, he argued, people lacked the notion of something 
like an inner core. They were socially turned, outward-oriented rather than oriented towards 
themselves. The example of sensibility, with its stress on empathy, neatly demonstrates this: 
people’s emotions were oriented towards others, not towards themselves. Carolyn Steedman 
(1995) has, from a somewhat different perspective, also argued that a sense of interiority 
increased between the late eighteenth and the early twentieth century. Particularly through the 
idea of childhood, people provided themselves with an interiorized self that was the result of 
a personal history, an idea that culminated in Freud’s thought. 
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Discourses of outer orientation can be found in two kinds: there are those discourses 
that imply that the self is mainly socially orientated, such as the ones that Wahrman has 
analysed in the earlier eighteenth century, and there are those discourses that consider the 
body to be the most important element of the self. Despite a growing sense of depths, outer 
orientation has remained important, even in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries. The idea 
of ‘embarrassment’, for instance, which had a determining role in twentieth-century 
American life, refers far more to social orientation than to inner depths (Holland and Kipnis, 
1994). Similarly, phrenology (Goldstein, 1999: 48–9) and criminal anthropology (Horn, 
2003) continued to focus on the body as an indication of the self in the nineteenth century. At 
the same time, discourses of interiority were also present before the end of the eighteenth 
century. In early Christianity, for instance, there was a great interest in techniques of self-
examination, in discovering what was hidden ‘inside’ – Saint Augustin’s Confessions may 
serve as a prime example (Foucault, 1993). Narratives of interiority and bodily or social 
orientation both continue to appear throughout history.  
A discourse that is sometimes connected to interiority is the discourse of authenticity. 
The sense of an inner self may be combined with a sense that this inner self is a ‘true self’ 
and that one needs to live accordingly. Linked to Enlightenment cultural criticism, 
‘authenticity’, or this interpretation of authenticity, seems to have been a more innovative 
idea of the late eighteenth century. Jean-Jacques Rousseau has often been identified as one of 
the originators of this new cult of fidelity to one’s true self, this celebration of one’s 
individuality (Carnevali, 2014). It is important to note that interiority does not always 
suppose authenticity. It seems that, before the late eighteenth century, and in many social 
circles also afterwards, there was a social obligation to conceal aspects of the inner self. In 
her study of eighteenth-century manner books, Eveline Koolhaas-Grosfeld (2011) has shown, 
for example, that introspection was seen a necessary means to control one’s self and to be 
able to follow rules of civility. Awareness of a ‘true self’ did not therefore necessitate 
attaching great significance to it. It is, moreover, important to acknowledge that, even though 
discourses of ‘being yourself’ or ‘having your own style’ abound in late-twentieth century 
society, the idea that the inner self should be controlled and concealed has never disappeared. 
Perhaps even more extremely, calls for self-renunciation also continually occur, even, as 
Charly Coleman (2014) has shown, even at the height of ‘authenticity’ discourse of the late 
eighteenth century. 
The second axis that I would like to discuss concerns stability and flexibility. Dror 
Wahrman has, again, most lucidly stated that the modern self is a stable self. He has observed 
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that in the short eighteenth century, ‘identity play’, crossing borders of gender, race and class, 
was possible and to a certain extent acceptable, for instance in masquerades. Similarly, 
Stephen Greenblatt (1984) has argued that people in the Renaissance quite self-consciously 
‘fashioned’ their selves. Identities were malleable and flexible. This all changed with the 
advent of a stable self at the end of the eighteenth century, Wahrman has argued. The borders 
of identity categories, or at least some of them, were no longer to be crossed: the popularity 
of masquerades diminished; children were no longer considered to be tabulae rasae, but to 
have been born with particular characteristics which they could not overcome. They had a 
stable self.  
Now the nineteenth century of course also had its share of crooks, con-artists and 
transvestites, crossing boundaries and playing with different identities. Moreover, as 
Warhman (2004: 278–81) himself has noted, some identity categories, such as nation and 
religion, became more loose and changeable from the late eighteenth century on. So again, 
we see conflicting discourses. A sense of a stable self has always been disrupted by 
discourses of flexibility and malleability. 
Connected to the question of the stability and flexibility of the self, is the axis of 
autonomous self-control (as in: being in control of yourself) and dispossession. The 
autonomous individual has had many historiographical births – in antiquity, in early 
Christianity, in the twelfth century, in the renaissance, and in the seventeenth, eighteenth, 
nineteenth and twentieth centuries. Unlike people from a usually only loosely defined ‘earlier 
era’, the ‘modern individual’ was able to make his (or her, but more often his) own decisions, 
independent of a larger collective (cf. Porter, 1997). It seems, however, that some degree of 
autonomy, some degree of agency and an ability to make self-conscious decisions, was 
present in every time. The degree to which this what Jerrold Seigel (2005) has called 
‘reflexive basis of selfhood’ was acknowledged, has however strongly varied, as Seigel 
himself and other intellectual historians have shown. 
More tangible, perhaps, than discourses of self-control are discourses of 
dispossession, discourses of not being in control. Again, intellectual historians have made 
essential analyses of discourses of social and biological determination, or, as Charly Coleman 
(2014) has recently done, of the ways in which people surrendered themselves to God. Far 
less research has been devoted to the use of discourses of lack of self-control in practice. 
Particularly interesting are discourses of what Dana Rabin (2004) has called ‘displacement of 
self’: individuals who are considered to normally be in control of themselves, use these 
discourses to evade responsibility for their actions at certain times. By referring to 
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drunkenness, possession or madness, individuals could claim ‘not to be themselves’ while 
they did or did not do something, effectively denying control over themselves at these times. 
Rabin argued that the use of these discourses in criminal court greatly expanded over the 
course of the eighteenth century. At the same time, it was implied that the individual, when 
not ‘displaced’, was in control of his or her own actions.  
Finally, discourses of holism and fragmentation can be distinguished. The most 
authoritative work in this respect has been Jan Goldstein’s (2005) The Post-Revolutionary 
Self. The dominant psychological theory in eighteenth-century France was ‘sensationalism’. 
In sensationalist thought, there was little concern for the idea of a unitary consciousness, 
which led to a conception of the mind as consisting of different mental faculties, operating 
somewhat independently, but nevertheless all knowable. At the end of the eighteenth century, 
and primarily in the nineteenth century, sensationalism was heavily criticized and replaced as 
the dominant psychology by ‘cousinianism’, named after its initiator Victor Cousin. Cousin 
and his followers constructed a psychology around a holist and a priori self. The idea of a 
fragmented self became less popular until the advent of Freud and the theory of the 
‘unconscious’, which proposed again that the self was fragmented, but this time, it was not 
able to know all aspects of itself. However, as Goldstein acknowledged, alternatives to 
Cousinian holist psychology, such as phrenology, which offered a fragmented conception of 
the self, were also referred to in the nineteenth century. Even then, discourses of a holist self 
were therefore not the only discourses available. 
These four variables overlap, intersect and interact on many important points. It is 
therefore crucial to note that these are not separate histories. Distinguishing them has 
however, I think, many methodological advantages and makes it possible to be better aware 
of what, exactly, we are talking about when we are talking about the self. It makes it possible, 
furthermore, to break up the idea of a single, unitary history of the self, and to consider 
convergences and divergences of different aspects of the self, through time and among 
different social groups. A proper history of the self needs to acknowledge these different 
aspects and integrate them into any larger narrative. 
 
Practices of self 
‘Scholars have written at great length about the emergence of individualism and autonomy as 
doctrines,’ wrote Lynn Hunt (2007: 33) in The Invention of Human Rights, ‘but much less 
about how the self itself might change over time.’ She raises an important point: to what 
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extent does thought about the self relate to the self, as it is experienced and practiced? Can we 
know the self apart from its representations? Does the self even have a history if it is not a 
history of its representations? Some scholars arguing for the universality of the self have 
posited that it is indeed only the representation of the self that changes (Sökefeld, 1999). 
Many others seem to implicitly assume that only ideas about and representations of the self 
are, in fact, knowable, and that history as a consequence should only study these. 
Historians working in other domains have, of course, encountered very similar 
problems. Nowhere have they been addressed more explicitly – at least in recent times – than 
in the historiography of emotions. The history of emotions intersects at crucial points with the 
history of the self (cf. Reddy, 2009): emotions have, for instance, been considered to ‘well 
up’ inside a person (interiority), or to make a person do things, ‘in rage’, he or she would 
otherwise not do (displacement). It is a domain that has known huge development over the 
last thirty years. While emotions had already been discussed by early pioneers as Johan 
Huizinga and Lucien Febvre, it was primarily from the 1980s on that emotions history gained 
a firm theoretical grounding.  
In 1985, Peter and Carol Stearns wrote a programmatic article for the history of 
emotions, in which they launched the term ‘emotionology’. With this neologism, they 
referred to ‘the collective emotional standards of a society’, which they tried to recover 
primarily from advice literature (Stearns and Stearns, 1985: 813). In this way, they 
distinguished emotionology, emotional standards and expressions, from emotions themselves, 
which were far more difficult to study. Studying emotionology had, however, as the Stearns’s 
readily admitted, a distinct disadvantage: they did not capture actual experiences. What they 
did not recognize, but what critics did, was that by coining the term ‘emotionology’, they 
widened the gap between experience and expression, as if these two were totally unrelated 
(Hoegaerts and Van Osselaer, 2013: 454). 
William Reddy (2001) therefore proposed another approach, with another neologism: 
‘emotives’. With his theory of emotives, he tried to find a balance between social 
constructionist and biological determinist approaches to emotions. Borrowing from speech 
act theory, he argued that emotives, verbal emotional expressions, were essential in shaping 
and managing emotions. Saying ‘I am sad’ was not just a statement of fact, but had self-
altering effects and changed the feeling itself. Reddy therefore emphasized the vocabulary of 
emotion to study the history of emotions. 
In a recent article, Monique Scheer (2012) found that the debate on whether historians 
had access to real experiences of emotions had not yet been resolved adequately. She 
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proposed an approach grounded in Bourdieu’s practice theory. Emotions are not something 
people have, she maintained, but something people do. By claiming that a person does not 
feel prior to the ‘doing’ of an emotion, the gap between experience and expression of 
emotions disappears. Scheer consequently discerned four categories of emotional practices: 
mobilizing (practices inducing an emotional state, e.g. penance), naming (like Reddy’s 
emotives), communicating (emotional expressions, like crying) and regulating practices 
(emotional norms). 
At several points, Scheer’s argument touched on the history of the self. Subjects, she 
posited, are nothing but the sequence of acts in which they participate. These acts encompass 
giving attention to ‘inner’ processes. People have to learn to cultivate an ‘inner self’, to be 
‘true to themselves’ (Scheer, 2012: 200). The self is not given and not only learned through 
theoretical instruction: interiority, autonomy, stability, wholeness and their counterparts are 
things that need to be done. Scheer’s theory therefore also seems to be a fruitful starting point 
to develop a theory of self that can encompass, or go beyond, experience and expression. 
Looking for the practices by which the self was formed may help us to take the history of the 
self to a new level. 
Let me first try to define, or delimit, what practices of self are. Practices of self are the 
things people do to shape, form and transform the self, the mental side of the individual. The 
self and a particular sense of self do not exist prior to these practices, but are created in them. 
People have to practice, have to do interiority or outer orientation, stability or flexibility, 
autonomy or dispossession, wholeness or fragmentation. We can find these practices of self 
in historical sources through other ‘doings and sayings’ on which these practices are 
dependent and intertwined. Adapting from Scheer’s categories of emotional practices, I 
discern four overlapping categories of practices of self.
2
 
(1) A first category concerns what Michel Foucault has called ‘techniques of self’, a 
concept he heavily relied on in his works and lectures of the 1980s. According to Foucault, 
technologies (or, as he says elsewhere, techniques) of self ‘permit individuals to effect by 
their own means or with the help of others a certain number of operations on their own bodies 
and souls, thought, conduct, and way of being, so as to transform themselves in order to attain 
a certain state of happiness, purity, wisdom, perfection, or immortality’ (Martin et al., 1988: 
                                                     
2 Scheer devotes much attention to the theoretical framework of practice theory, habitus and embodiment. These are vital 
notions to understand how practices work, but as they do not differ much for emotional practices or practices of self, I will 
not comment on her insights here. 
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18). Technologies of self allow people to form and transform their self. They are the things 
people do to change or stay the same, to gain control or to lose it, to discover their ‘true self’, 
to please others, to live more authentically or to renounce themselves.
3
 
As will strike many of those familiar with Foucault’s earlier work, mechanisms of 
power are curiously absent in this definition of ‘technologies of self’. The definition also 
seems rather naïve, as it rather unreflectively presupposes that individuals can autonomously 
work on themselves. Lynn Hunt has criticized this as an ahistorical approach to the history of 
the self, as ‘though the forms of self-transformation vary over time in Foucault's analysis, the 
grounds of its psychic possibility do not.’ Foucault’s concept is, she argued, ‘a distinctly 
modern or post-eighteenth-century formulation, in which individuals are figured as separate 
beings with separate selves who are able to act upon themselves and even transform 
themselves’ (Hunt, 1992: 85). We should, therefore, recognize that most of the techniques 
that people use to transform themselves are recommended or prescribed by a society 
(Goldstein, 1999: 43–4, 2005: 13). However, I would also allow room for the possibility of 
resistance against these technologies, for some autonomy. Just as power is present in every 
society, so is individual autonomy to some extent possible in every society. The ‘autonomous 
individual’ need not be present in a society for individuals to have some degree of autonomy. 
The concept of ‘techniques of the self’ makes possible the analysis of both disciplining and 
liberating techniques of forming and transforming the self.
4
 
Techniques of the self may be practiced alone, in a private setting or publically. They 
may produce the desired effect or they may not. Well-studied examples include meditating, 
confessing, penance, examining your conscience, autobiographical writing, psychoanalysis or 
taking psychological advice. But there are less obvious examples: drinking alcohol to lose 
self-control, for instance, or reading philosophical treatises to learn more about how the self 
works. Techniques of self can be practised voluntarily, though this is not necessary. People 
may be stimulated or even forced to do something to alter their self. Mandatory psychological 
therapy, for instance, may be part of a conviction.  
                                                     
3 This is similar to what Nedim Karakayali (2015) has called, in a recent article surveying the work of social scientists on the 
activities through which we shape our selves, ‘self practices’, the term which I will reserve for the larger category.  
4 As philosopher Ian Burkitt (2002) has noted, Foucault’s under-theorized concept of ‘technologies of the self’ greatly 
benefits from practice theory and the notion of ‘habit’ or ‘habitus’ as proposed by John Dewey and Pierre Bourdieu. It is yet 
another reason why it is useful to consider ‘technologies of the self’ as a particular form of practices of self. 
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Jan Goldstein has already very fruitfully employed the concept of ‘technologies of the 
self’ to study Cousinian psychology in early nineteenth-century France.5 Cousin’s method of 
introspection was not only the basis of his philosophical system, she posited, but a technology 
of the self. It was ‘a learned skill that helped to fashion a particular kind of self’. Cousin was 
rather vague about how this introspection, or ‘interior observation’ as he called it, should 
exactly take place and what it should discover. It was, however, the act of interior observation 
itself that was important, as it was through this act that people became active, responsible 
subjects. As they examined their inner selves, they established that they had a single, unitary 
self and that they could know this self. Through Cousinian introspection, people transformed 
their self to become more whole and more interior (Goldstein, 1999: 44–8, 2005: 165–71). 
(2) A second category of practices of self is made up of what Jan Goldstein has called 
‘self-talk’, or what Monique Scheer has termed ‘naming practices’. These are the practices by 
which people explicitly talk or write about their self, their inner or outer orientation, their 
wholeness or fragmentation, their autonomy or lack thereof. By saying something was 
‘inner’, people formed their sense of interiority, by claiming behaviour as a consequence of 
their true self or personality, they created this true self and personality. Self-talk has the same 
self-altering effects that William Reddy claimed for his ‘emotives’. The availability of a 
language to talk about the self therefore has a distinct influence on the way people do their 
self. 
Again, the example of Cousinian psychology could serve here: by creating a new 
language to talk about the self, Cousin and his followers changed it, they ‘shaped the self in 
part through the deceptively simple gesture of naming it, of affixing the label moi to a certain 
kind of mental content’ (Goldstein, 2005: 165). Perhaps even more telling is the impact of 
Freudian language on twentieth- and twenty-first-century conceptions of self. It is today hard 
to write about people’s motivations without referring to their ‘unconscious’ desires and goals. 
The omnipresence of the language of the unconscious has changed the way we think of 
ourselves and of others: it has given us an even greater sense of depth, a sense of 
dispossession, of not being fully in control of ourselves, and of fragmentation. 
(3) Interpretations are a third category of practices to consider. People may be seen as 
intentionally and unintentionally conveying aspects of their self in all sorts of practices. 
                                                     
5 Although Goldstein uses the concept in a slightly different way than I do: her definition of ‘technologies of the self’ does 
not require that people perform these techniques on themselves; she also allows less space for resistance and individual 
autonomy. This does not, however, affect the example of Cousinian psychology as I give it here. 
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These practices can be interpreted, by themselves and by others, in varying ways and these 
interpretations in turn influence the self. When people explain behaviour, they often link this 
to the self: they can refer to internal or external circumstances, to true selves or to temporary 
displacements. In doing so, they again form and transform the self. 
Dror Wahrman (2004: 294–99) has referred to many of these interpreting practices in 
his study of the making of the modern self. A great example is the use of physiognomy in late 
eighteenth-century Britain. The late eighteenth century witnessed the reinvention of 
physiognomy, the art of interpreting people’s physical appearance as a sign of their character, 
by the Swiss philosopher Johann Kaspar Lavater in his Physiognomische Fragmente (1775-
78). In Lavater’s new approach, physiognomy’s goal was still to discover ‘the 
correspondence between the external and internal man’, but now the individual was, unlike in 
earlier versions of physiognomy, considered as a whole. Not just aspects (type of eyebrows, 
weight,…) were studied, but the whole face or even the whole body became ‘the index of the 
mind’. The popularity of Lavater and his followers was enormous. Their work not only points 
to changing conceptions of self, but also enacted these conceptions: people started to consider 
themselves and others as more stable, more unique and more whole. Although Wahrman does 
not recognize this, it also points to an outer orientation: people did not have to search their 
interior to find their true self, but could just read their bodies and faces. 
(4) Regulating practices are Scheer’s final category and I use it here as well. This term 
refers to social norms concerning the self, as conveyed in self-help manuals, philosophical 
and moralising literature, by preachers and psychologists and in education, all written to 
change and regulate other people’s selves. People are sometimes explicitly instructed to live 
authentically, to explore their self, or to renounce their self-interest; at other times, they are 
implicitly told that they will be held accountable for their behaviour, that their self is whole, 
or that they cannot change. They may also be taught that the unified self is a fiction, a bundle 
of perceptions, or, on the contrary, that it founds all human knowledge. 
The most obvious example here is perhaps the cult of authenticity in the second half 
of the eighteenth century, as most famously personified by Jean-Jacques Rousseau. Rousseau 
advocated living in a state of nature, free from social influences. Especially in his Emile 
(1762). his book on the education of children, he argued that people – at least, men – should 
learn to discover their inner natures and to rely on this nature when making decisions. He had 
experienced this in his own life, for, as he concluded in his autobiographical Rêveries du 
promeneur solitaire (1776-8) when he acted not on his own urges, but according to what 
people expected from him, deeds that could have been useful only brought harm and misery. 
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Rousseau clearly argued against a social orientation of the male self. With this 
argumentation, Rousseau tried to regulate other people’s selves (Seigel, 2005: 210–47). 
Looking for these four categories of practices of self in the available historical sources 
makes it possible to go beyond debates about experience versus expression, beyond debates 
about self-conscious expressions versus ‘unstructured intuitions’. It is vital to recognize 
whether people themselves considered these as differences, but equally vital to recognize that 
expressions of self are never just expressions, but make up the self itself. 
 
In conclusion 
In this article, I have made two methodological suggestions for doing the history of the self. 
First, I have proposed destabilizing the modern self by writing the histories of its different 
and paradoxical aspects, such as (1) interiority and outer orientation, (2) stability and 
flexibility, (3) holism and fragmentation, and (4) self-control and dispossession. Second, to 
bridge the perceived gap between ideas and experiences, I proposed studying four ‘practices 
of self’ through which the self is created, namely (1) techniques of self, (2) self-talk, (3) 
interpreting the self, and (4) regulating practices. 
Using this double approach may help to overcome some of the problems that currently 
occupy scholars in the history of the self. By way of conclusion, I will try to illustrate the 
advantages of this methodology with an application from my own research concerning stigma 
and the self in the late eighteenth century. My aim is to find out whether and how the self 
changed between 1750 and 1830 among common people and especially people on the 
margins. To do so, I study trial records, particularly suspect interrogations, of various sorts of 
criminals. It is often very difficult to approach these sources with traditional methods used to 
study the self: only very rarely is the self explicitly referred to. The four axes and the four 
practices I discern can help to approach less obvious sources that are not generally used to 
study the self.  
Take, for instance, the case of Jacob Mol, accused of attempting to murder his wife in 
Antwerp in 1750 (Felix Archives Antwerp V 103 Jacob Mol 1750). When he was asked ‘how 
he had lived with his wife’, he told judges their whole history together, up to the moment that 
he had stabbed her. Nine years earlier, he had married Françoise Ketelaar, only to leave her 
eight weeks later after a heavy row. A few weeks on, he started to live with her again for a 
while. Then they separated again, and so their marriage continued with ups and downs. Mol 
described some of the fights they had, and, eventually, how his wife angered him by 
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continually insulting him the evening he stabbed her. ‘Mort Dieu,’ he said, ‘I won’t bear this 
any longer’. His wife then blew out the lights, he grabbed a knife and stabbed her. When the 
judges asked him why, he said he did it ‘because he was in fury and huge anger’. 
While this case does, in the first instance, not seem to provide much information on 
the self, closer inspection using the methods described above allows us to learn a great deal. 
Most obvious are the regulating practices initiated by the judges: by asking Mol ‘how he had 
lived with his wife’, they tried to tie his past history with Ketelaar to his more recent actions, 
thus suggesting a stable self. By asking him why he had stabbed his wife, they moreover tried 
to cast his actions as autonomous, wilful decisions. Mol, however, resisted these attempts to 
regulate his self, interpreting his actions and history in a different way. While he went along 
with his judges when describing his long-standing history of quarrels with his wife, he did 
suggest a break. The ill-fated evening, he was ‘half-drunk’ and he stabbed her while ‘in fury’, 
therefore, as his solicitor would later argue, he was at that time ‘non compos sui’, not in 
control of himself. So, while Mol indicated that he was generally in control of his actions, at 
that specific moment his autonomous self was apparently ‘displaced’, it was not stable 
enough to withstand the combination of drunkenness and anger. 
Mol’s confession was, of course, in the first place something demanded by his judges. 
But in this particular case, it was not only a regulating practice. Mol himself actively sought 
to confess his crime. After he had stabbed his wife and he thought that she was dead, he put 
on his best clothes, went to a friendly officer and asked him to take him to prison. The 
officer, however, first took Mol home again, to check whether his wife was really dead. This 
happened not to be the case; in fact she had only suffered minor injuries. Mol was surprised, 
but still insisted that he be taken to prison for interrogation. While his motivations are not 
made clear, this could be interpreted as a technology of self, actively seeking to come clean 
and practicing honesty and authenticity. 
The case of Jacob Mol also illustrates how the self is socially shaped. Practices of the 
self are often given form in groups and in institutions. While a detailed analysis of the role of 
institutions of punishment in the shaping of the self would take us too far (but see Butler, 
2005: 7–22; Foucault, 1973, 1975), it is clear that criminal courts are highly invested in a 
reflexive, stable and autonomous self. The regulating practices legal and political structures 
imposed on Mol and his contemporaries show that the self did not develop on its own, but 
was at least in part socially determined. 
This single case is of course just that – a single case. What I wish to show is that the 
methods I propose allow us to look at sources in a different way, analysing the different 
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practices of the self from different positions and identifying conflicting discourses. It shows 
us how the self was practiced in different situations and what the effect of these practices 
was. Sources are approached not just as ‘signs’ of self, but as having an active part in the 
constitution of the selves, as their creation went along with several practices of self. The 
discourses and practices of self that I discern are not exhaustive: other scholars will 
doubtlessly consider other aspects of the self that have changed through time, other sorts of 
practices by which the self was enacted. The theoretical and methodological reflections in 
this paper may help, however, to better articulate the different positions in the field and 
advance discussion and reflection. That is how we should do the history of the self. 
 
References 
Boswell, J. (1980) Christianity, Social Tolerance, and Homosexuality: Gay People in 
Western Europe from the Beginning of the Christian Era to the Fourteenth Century. 
Chicago: University of Chicago Press. 
Burkitt, I. (2002) 'Technologies of the Self: Habitus and Capacities', Journal for the Theory of 
Social Behaviour 32: 219–37. 
Butler, J. (2005) Giving an Account of Oneself. New York: Fordham University Press. 
Carnevali, B. (2014) 'Rousseau et l’authenticité. Le concept d’authenticité chez Rousseau'  
[Rousseau and Authenticity. The Concept of Authenticity for Rousseau], in Y. Citton 
and J.-F. Perrin (eds) Jean-Jacques Rousseau et l’exigence d’authenticité. Une 
question pour notre temps [Jean-Jacques Rouseau and the Demand of Authenticity. A 
Question for Our Times]. Paris: Classiques Garnier, pp. 23–34. 
Coleman, C. (2014) The Virtues of Abandon: An Anti-individualist History of the French 
Enlightenment. Stanford: Stanford University Press. 
Foucault, M., ed. (1973) Moi, Pierre Rivière, ayant égorgé ma mère, ma soeur et mon frère... 
Un cas de parricide au XIXe siècle [I, Pierre Rivière, having slaughtered my mother, 
my sister, and my brother… A Case of Parricide in the Nineteenth Century]. Paris: 
Julliard. 
Foucault, M. (1975) Surveiller et punir. Naissance de la prison [Discipline and Punish. The 
Birth of the Prison]. Paris: Gallimard. 
Foucault, M. (1993) 'About the Beginning of the Hermeneutics of the Self: Two Lectures at 
Dartmouth', Political Theory 21: 198–227. 
19 
 
Geertz, C. (1974) ‘"From the Native’s Point of View": On the Nature of Anthropological 
Understanding', Bulletin of the American Academy of Arts and Sciences 28: 26–45. 
Goldstein, J. (1999) 'Foucault’s Technologies of the Self and the Cultural History of Identity', 
in J. Neubauer (ed.) Cultural History after Foucault. New York: de Gruyter, pp. 37–
54. 
Goldstein, J. (2005) The Post-revolutionary Self: Politics and Psyche in France, 1750-1850. 
Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press. 
Greenberg, D. F. (1988) The Construction of Homosexuality. Chicago: University of Chicago 
Press. 
Greenblatt, S. (1984) Renaissance Self-fashioning: From More to Shakespeare. Chicago: 
University of Chicago Press. 
Halperin, D. M. (1990) One Hundred Years of Homosexuality: And Other Essays on Greek 
Love. New York: Routledge. 
Halperin, D. M. (2000) 'How to Do the History of Male Homosexuality', GLQ: A Journal of 
Lesbian and Gay Studies 6(1): 87–123. 
Halperin, D. M. (2002) How to do the History of Homosexuality. Chicago: University of 
Chicago Press. 
Hoegaerts, J. and Van Osselaer, T. (2013) 'De lichamelijkheid van emoties. Een introductie' 
[The embodiment of emotions. An introduction], Tijdschrift voor geschiedenis 
126(4): 452–65. 
Holland, D. and Kipnis, A. (1994) 'Metaphors for Embarrassment and Stories of Exposure: 
The Not-so-egocentric Self in American Culture', Ethos 22: 316–42. 
Horn, D. G. (2003) The Criminal Body: Lombroso and the Anatomy of Deviance. London: 
Routledge. 
Houlbrook, M. (2013) 'Thinking Queer: The Social and the Sexual in Interwar Britain', in B. 
Lewis (ed.) British Queer History: New Approaches and Perspectives. Manchester: 
Manchester University Press, pp. 134–64. 
Hunt, L. (1992) 'Foucault’s Subject in The History of Sexuality', in D. C. Stanton (ed.) 
Discourses of Sexuality: From Aristotle to AIDS. Ann Arbor: University of Michigan 
Press, pp. 78–93. 
Hunt, L. (2007) Inventing Human Rights: A History. New York: W. W. Norton. 
Hunt, L. (2014) 'The Self and its History', The American Historical Review 119(5): 1576–86. 
20 
 
Karakayali, N. (2015) 'Adapting, Defending and Transforming Ourselves. Conceptualizations 
of Self Practices in the Social Science Literature', History of the Human Sciences 
28(1): 98–117. 
Keller, W. R. (2008) Selves & Nations: The Troy Story from Sicily to England in the Middle 
Ages. Heidelberg: Winter. 
Koolhaas-Grosfeld, E. (2011) 'Behind the Mask of Civility: Physiognomy and Unmasking in 
the Early Eighteenth-century Dutch Republic', in A. Baggerman, R. Dekker and M. 
Mascuch (eds) Controlling Time and Shaping the Self: Developments in 
Autobiographical Writing Since the Sixteenth Century, Leiden: Brill, pp. 247–66. 
Lyons, J. O. (1978) The Invention of the Self: The Hinge of Consciousness in the Eighteenth 
Century. Carbondale: Southern Illinois University Press. 
Martin, L. H., Gutman, H. and Hutton, P. H., eds (1988) Technologies of the Self: A Seminar 
with Michel Foucault. Amherst: University of Massachusetts. 
Mauss, M. (1938) 'Une catégorie de l’esprit humain: la notion de personne, celle de "moi"' [A 
Category of the Human Mind: the Notion of the Person, the Notion of the Self], The 
Journal of the Royal Anthropological Institute of Great Britain and Ireland 68: 263–
81. 
McIntosh, M. (1968) 'The Homosexual Role', Social Problems 16: 182–92. 
Murray, D. W. (1993) 'What is the Western Concept of the Self? On Forgetting David Hume', 
Ethos 21: 3–23. 
Norton, R. (1997) The Myth of the Modern Homosexual: Queer History and the Search for 
Cultural Unity. London: Cassell. 
Owens, T. J. and Samblanet, S. (2013) 'Self and Self-concept', in J. DeLamater and A. Ward 
(eds) Handbook of Social Psychology. Handbooks of Sociology and Social Research, 
Springer, pp. 225–49. 
Paul, H. (2012) 'The Scholarly Self: Ideals of Intellectual Virtue in Nineteenth-century 
Leiden', in L. W. M. Bod, J. Maat, and M. A. Weststeijn (eds) The Making of the 
Humanities, Vol. 2: From Early Modern to Modern Disciplines. Amsterdam: 
Amsterdam University Press, pp. 397–411. 
Porter, R. (1997) 'Introduction', in R. Porter (ed.) Rewriting the Self: Histories from the 
Renaissance to the Present. London: Routledge, pp. 1–14. 
Rabin, D. (2004) Identity, Crime, and Legal Responsibility in Eighteenth-century England. 
Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan. 
21 
 
Reddy, W. M. (2001) The Navigation of Feeling: A Framework for the History of Emotions. 
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 
Reddy, W. M. (2009) 'Historical Research on the Self and Emotions', Emotion Review 1(4): 
302–15. 
Sabean, D. W. and Stefanovska, M., eds (2012) Space and Self in Early Modern European 
Cultures. Toronto: University of Toronto Press. 
Scheer, M. (2012) 'Are Emotions a Kind of Practice (and is that what makes them have a 
history)? A Bourdieuian Approach to Understanding Emotion', History and Theory 
51(2): 193–220. 
Sedgwick, E. K. (1990) Epistemology of the Closet. Berkeley: University of California Press. 
Seigel, J. (2005) The Idea of the Self: Thought and Experience in Western Europe Since the 
Seventeenth Century. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 
Sökefeld, M. (1999) 'Debating Self, Identity, and Culture in Anthropology', Current 
Anthropology 40: 417–48. 
Spiro, M. E. (1993) 'Is the Western Conception of the Self "Peculiar" Within the Context of 
the World Cultures? Ethos 21: 107–53. 
Stearns, P. N. and Stearns, C. Z. (1985) 'Emotionology: Clarifying the History of Emotions 
and Emotional Standards', The American Historical Review 90: 813–36. 
Steedman, C. (1995) Strange Dislocations: Childhood and the Idea of Human Interiority, 
1780-1930. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press. 
Stein, E. ed. (1992) Forms of Desire: Sexual Orientation and the Social Constructionist 
Controversy. New York: Routledge. 
Taylor, C. (1989) Sources of the Self: The Making of the Modern Identity. Cambridge, MA: 
Harvard University Press. 
Traub, V. (2013) 'The New Unhistoricism in Queer Studies', PMLA 128(1): 21–39. 
Trumbach, R. (1989) 'The Birth of the Queen: Sodomy and the Emergence of Gender 
Equality in Modern Culture, 1660-1750', in M. Duberman, M. Vicinus and G. 
Chauncey (eds) Hidden from History: Reclaiming the Gay and Lesbian Past. New 
York: New American library, pp. 129–40. 
Wahrman, D. (2004) The Making of the Modern Self: Identity and Culture in Eighteenth-
Century England. New Haven: Yale University Press. 
 
